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1 
By Any Means Necessary?  The FCC’s Implementation of Net Neutrality 
- Dawn C. Nunziato1 
[W]e say to the public that there is a place, the FCC, where you can come to have 
allegations of network neutrality violations heard and acted upon.2 
Introduction 
Since the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) removed common 
carriage obligations3 from Internet cable broadband providers in 2002, free speech and 
open access advocates have been lamenting the FCC’s market-oriented, laissez-faire 
approach and have called for net neutrality regulation to remedy the problems brought 
about by an unregulated market for Internet communications.  Such regulation would 
reimpose some of the common carriage/non-discrimination obligations historically 
imposed on telecommunications providers and would prohibit broadband providers from 
censoring, blocking, or otherwise discriminating against any legal content or applications 
that users sought to communicate via broadband pipes.  In August 2008, however, the 
FCC reversed its laissez-faire course and censured Comcast—one of the nation’s largest 
broadband providers—for engaging in discriminatory network management practices.  In 
its Comcast4 order, the FCC condemned Comcast’s practice of engaging in the 
clandestine blocking of certain peer-to-peer file-sharing applications and ordered it to 
discontinue these and other “unreasonable” network management practices and to come 
clean with the public about the ways in which it manages communications on its 
network.5 
Some have argued that the FCC’s willingness to act in these circumstances 
obviates the need for general net neutrality regulation or for broadly-applicable 
rulemaking by the FCC.6  In this Article, I contend that, while these recent actions by the 
FCC are a step in the right direction, the FCC’s ad hoc, ex post adjudication actions stand 
on uneasy jurisdictional footing and, in any case, are insufficient to remedy fully the 
problems caused by the FCC’s removing nondiscrimination obligations from broadband 
providers in the first place—most significantly, the harm to the free flow of expression on 
1 © Dawn Carla Nunziato, Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  I 
am grateful to Dean Frederick Lawrence for his encouragement and generous financial support; 
to the participants of the University of North Carolina’s First Amendment Law Review 
Cyberspeech Symposium for their comments and questions; to Padmaja Balakrishnan for 
outstanding secretarial support; and to Brian Day for excellent research assistance. 
2 Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13079 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order). 
3 “Common carriage obligations” refer to a regulatory framework imposed on common carriers.  
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-31 (2006). 
4 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order). 
5 Id. at 13028. 
6 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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the Internet.  In Part I of this Article, I describe the uneven history of the FCC’s 
regulatory treatment of Internet service providers (ISPs).  In Part II, I analyze the 
Comcast network management practices that were the subject of the FCC’s August 2008 
order, as well as the order itself.  In particular, I scrutinize the FCC’s asserted basis for 
claiming jurisdiction to adjudicate such actions by broadband providers, in light of the 
fact that the FCC had previously classified such providers as subject to minimal 
regulatory oversight.  In Part III, I contend that—notwithstanding the order and the 
FCC’s apparent willingness of late to impose checks on broadband providers’ censorial 
and discriminatory conduct—broadly applicable, ex ante legislative or agency action is 
necessary to impose general nondiscrimination obligations on broadband providers.  
Congress should enact net neutrality legislation to prohibit broadband providers from 
discriminating against legal content or applications in the form of censoring or degrading 
such expression, or should require the FCC to adopt binding, generally-applicable rules 
prohibiting such discrimination.   
 
I. Regulation (and Deregulation) of Internet Service Providers:  
The FCC’s Decisions Exempting Broadband Providers from the Common Carriage 
Obligations Historically Imposed on Conduits for Communication 
 
 From the beginning of the mass communications era, the United States imposed 
“common carrier” obligations on certain powerful private entities engaged in providing 
transportation for, and facilitating the communications of, the public to facilitate the free 
flow of commerce and information free of censorship or discrimination.7  Through the 
common carriage doctrine, the government, by way of legislation and the common law, 
imposed nondiscrimination duties on entities providing transportation and facilitating 
communication for the public, like telephone companies and the postal service.8  Rather 
than granting communications and telecommunications providers the discretion to 
regulate speech however they see fit, the common carriage doctrine requires that such 
conduits not discriminate among the communications they are charged with carrying.9  
As the Internet grew to become an increasingly popular medium of communication, the 
question how to regulate those who facilitated Internet communications arose.10  In the 
formative years of the Internet’s development, the FCC regulated ISPs—including 
narrowband and Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) providers—as common carriers subject 
(inter alia) to nondiscrimination obligations.11  Yet in 2002, the FCC began a process of 
removing such obligations from providers of broadband Internet access.12  This course of 
removing such obligations from broadband providers was approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
                                                 
7 See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE 
INTERNET AGE, 65-69 (2009). 
8 Id. at 65-66. 
9 Id. at 67-68. 
10 Id. at 115-22. 
11 Id. at 120-21. 
12 Id. at 121-27. 
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Services.13  Below, I outline the evolution of the FCC’s deregulation of Internet conduits 
for communication.   
 
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress granted the FCC the authority to 
regulate telephone companies as common carriers.14  The common carriage obligations 
imposed on telecommunications providers ensured that the public had a right to 
communicate via telephone free from discrimination by the telephone companies.15  In 
the 1970s, as telephone companies began offering other types of services in addition to 
serving as conduits for telephone conversations, the FCC articulated a framework to 
distinguish between their conduit function and the value-added services that they offered.  
In a series of three “Computer Inquiry” decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC 
established essentially the following two categories of services: (1) basic services—those 
that “offer[ed] . . . transmission capacity for the movement of information”—which were 
regulated as common carriers16 and (2) “enhanced” or value-added services—those that 
“combin[ed] basic service with computer processing applications that act on the . . . 
subscriber’s transmitted information, or provide the subscriber additional, different, or 
restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored information”—
which were not regulated as common carriers.17  
 
In its passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,18 Congress revised the 
categorization of services subject to common carriage regulation.  Under the 1996 Act, 
“telecommunications services” were made subject to common carriage regulation 
(replacing the category of “basic services”), while “information services” were exempted 
from mandatory common carriage regulation (replacing the exempt category of 
“enhanced services”).19  While the Act maintained significant common carrier obligations 
on providers of telecommunications services, it left information services providers 
subject to far less stringent regulation.20  Such services were merely subject to regulation 
under the FCC’s amorphous ancillary jurisdiction—i.e., its jurisdiction to impose 
additional regulatory obligations ancillary to its jurisdiction to regulate interstate and 
foreign communications.21   
 
A central issue in interpreting the Telecommunications Act was how, if at all, the 
provision of broadband Internet access by cable providers (and of broadband access more 
                                                 
13 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
14 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2006)). 
15 Id. § 202, 48 Stat. at 1070 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 202). 
16 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II] (final decision). 
17 Id.  
18 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
19 See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2006). 
20 See id. §§ 153, 201-31. 
21 See id. § 154(i). 
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generally) should be regulated.22  If regulated as telecommunications services, broadband 
providers would be subject to common carriage regulation, which would prohibit them 
from, among other things, discriminating against any legal content or applications (and 
would also require them to allow interconnection by unaffiliated ISPs).23  If regulated 
instead as providers of information services, broadband providers would be exempt from 
common carriage obligations and would be subject only to the FCC’s ancillary 
jurisdiction.  When it enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress did not 
resolve this question and presumably vested the FCC with the discretion to make this 
determination. 
 
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress also set forth several 
broad tenets of federal Internet policy.  On one hand, the Act provides that the Internet 
should be allowed to flourish in a “minimal regulatory environment”24 characterized by a 
“free market . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”25  On the other hand, the Act 
articulates the federal Internet policy of “maximiz[ing] user control over what 
information is received by individuals . . .who use the Internet.”26  A conflict arises—as it 
did in the Comcast adjudication27—when maximizing Internet users’ control over what 
Internet content or applications they will receive requires regulation of ISPs. 
 
In determining how to regulate broadband providers, the FCC was required to 
decide whether to place them under the same regulatory framework as narrowband 
providers. Providers of narrowband Internet access offer connection via traditional 
telephone lines and are regulated as telecommunications services subject to common 
carrier regulation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.28  Over the past ten years, 
however, as Internet technology has advanced, many Internet users have migrated from 
the dial-up, narrowband universe to broadband technologies, which provide vastly faster 
Internet access.29  The predominant broadband technologies used by residential Internet 
users are provided via high-speed cable modems and DSL.30  Because DSL broadband 
Internet access is provided via telephone lines, the provision of this service was initially 
regulated as a telecommunications service subject to common carriage 
                                                 
22 See generally Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access Over Cable, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677 (2001) (noting that the regulation of cable-based high-speed Internet is 
a difficult topic in light of the existing regulatory framework). 
23 The Act provides that common carriers must furnish service upon reasonable request and must 
establish reasonable charges, practices, classifications, and regulations regarding service.  47 
U.S.C. § 201.  It also imposes obligations upon common carriers to interconnect with the 
facilities and services of other carriers and end users, and sets out the terms and conditions under 
which incumbent carriers must interconnect with newcomer carriers.  Id. § 251. 
24 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 
F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
25 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
26 Id. § 230(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
27 Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13079 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order). 
28 See 47 U.S.C. § 153. 
29 See NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at 121. 
30 Id. 
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/nondiscrimination regulations.31  The regulation of broadband access via cable, however, 
proved to be a more complicated question.  Cable broadband providers were not 
providing traditional telecommunications services and traditionally cable providers were 
providing their own choice of content to users via one-way connections.32  Yet, as they 
upgraded their wires to allow for two-way Internet communications, they began to 
provide services that looked like traditional telecommunications conduit services.33  If 
cable broadband providers essentially served as conduits for the Internet content 
originated by others—in the same way that narrowband and DSL providers did–
regulatory parity would dictate that they be subject to the same types of common 
carriage/non-discrimination obligations as were dial-up and DSL providers.  But the 
principle of regulatory parity did not carry the day.  
 
The FCC’s 2002 Declaratory Ruling Exempting Cable Broadband From Common 
Carriage Regulation 
 
 In 2000, the FCC initiated a rulemaking proceeding to determine how to apply the 
Telecommunications Act’s classifications to cable broadband providers.  In its 2002 
declaratory ruling, “Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and 
Other Facilities”34, the FCC concluded that cable broadband was an “information service” 
with “no separate offering of telecommunications service.”35  Having concluded that cable 
companies do not provide telecommunications services when they offer broadband cable 
Internet services, the FCC ruled that the provision of such services was outside the scope 
of Title II’s mandatory common carriage regulatory framework.36  The FCC ruled that the 
provision of cable broadband service does not contain a separate telecommunications 
service because the transmission of the Internet user’s communications is “part and 
parcel” of that information service, and is integral to its capabilities.37  As an information 
service with “no separate offering of telecommunications service,”38 cable operators’ 
provision of broadband Internet access was exempt from the common carrier regulations 
of Title II and was subject only to the FCC’s “Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate 
interstate and foreign communications.”39  The FCC based its decision, in part, on the 
policy judgment that “broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory 
environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market.”40  Yet, 
notwithstanding its conclusion that cable broadband was exempt from Title II common 
carriage regulation, the FCC solicited comments in a companion notice of proposed 
rulemaking regarding whether it should, under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction, require 
                                                 
31 Id. at 120. 
32 Id. at 121. 
33 Id.  
34 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
35 Id. at 4802. 
36 Id. at 4847-48. 
37 Id. at 4823. 
38 Id. at 4802 
39 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005). 
40 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802.   
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cable companies to provide open access and to offer other ISPs access to their facilities on 
common-carrier terms.41 
 
  The FCC’s decision to exempt cable broadband from common carriage 
obligations was challenged by non-facilities-based ISPs that sought open access and 
asserted the right to interconnect with cable providers’ pipelines.42  These ISPs sought a 
ruling that cable broadband providers should be regulated as providers of 
telecommunications services subject to common carriage obligations.43  In its 2005 Brand 
X decision, the Supreme Court held that the FCC enjoyed the discretion to interpret the 
Telecommunications Act, as it had done in its Declaratory Ruling, to decline to subject 
cable operators’ provision of broadband Internet access—or the provision of any other 
type of broadband Internet access—to common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations. 44  
The Supreme Court also explained that the FCC enjoyed the authority under its ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate broadband providers—even while not regulating them as common 
carriers—if necessary to advance the federal government’s and the FCC’s general 
policies in the Internet realm.45  Such amorphous and unfettered ancillary jurisdiction and 
discretion, however, have proved problematic, as is evident in the FCC’s recent exercise 
of this authority. 
 
The Brand X Decision 
 
 In Brand X, the Supreme Court set into motion a course of events that led to the 
FCC’s recent adjudicatory actions.  The Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act, as amended by the 
Telecommunications Act, did not require it to revisit its earlier holding46 that cable 
broadband was subject to common carriage regulation under Title II.47  The Ninth Circuit 
held that the FCC could not permissibly construe the Communications Act to exempt 
cable broadband from Title II common carriage regulation.48  The Supreme Court 
reversed.49   
 
In a rare parting of ways between Justices Thomas, who authored the opinion of 
the Court, and Scalia, who issued a scathing dissent, Justice Thomas first explained that 
as a matter of administrative law, the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to apply Chevron 
deference50 to the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling.51  Under Chevron, a federal court is 
                                                 
41  Id. at 4839-42. 
42 See, e.g., NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at 122. 
43 Id. at 125. 
44 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002. 
45 Id. at 976. 
46 AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
47 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979-80. 
48 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 545 U.S. 967 
(2005).  
49  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003. 
50 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) 
(holding that if a statute is ambiguous and the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, 
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permitted to substitute its construction of the statute for the agency’s only if it concludes 
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute.52  Because the 
Ninth Circuit had concluded merely that its reading was the best reading—not the only 
permissible reading—of the statute, the Ninth Circuit’s construction could not trump the 
FCC’s construction of the statute.53 
 
 The Supreme Court first held that the Telecommunications Act was ambiguous as 
to whether cable broadband providers were providers of telecommunications services.54 
While cable companies use “telecommunications” to provide consumers with Internet 
service, they were not necessarily offering telecommunications services, according to the 
Court.55  Rather, the Court credited the FCC’s reasoning that whether the service 
included a telecommunications offering “‘turn[ed] on the nature of the functions the end 
user is offered.’”56  Seen from the end user’s perspective, cable broadband is not a 
telecommunications service because “the consumer uses the high-speed wire always in 
connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and 
because the transmission is a necessary component of Internet access.”57  According to 
the FCC’s analysis (credited by the Court), end users make use of the wire provided by 
cable companies in order to “access the World Wide Web, newsgroups, and so forth, 
rather than ‘transparently’ to transmit and receive . . . messages without computer 
processing or storage of the message.”58  Because such communications were always 
integrated with computer processing and storage, the FCC permissibly concluded that 
“cable modem service was not a ‘stand-alone,’ transparent offering of 
telecommunications.”59  The Court rejected the argument that cable companies providing 
Internet service necessarily also provide telecommunications service because they 
provide the underlying telecommunications used to transmit Internet services: 
 
Cable companies in the broadband Internet service business “offe[r]” 
consumers an information service in the form of Internet access and they 
do so “via telecommunications,” but it does not inexorably follow as a 
matter of ordinary language that they also “offe[r]” consumers . . . 
(telecommunications) that is an input used to provide this service. . . .  
 
. . . . 
                                                                                                                                                 
a federal court must accept the agency’s construction even if it differs from what the court 
believes is the best statutory interpretation). 
51 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980-82. 
52 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.   
53 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984-85. 
54 Id. at 986. 
55 Id. at 989. 
56 Id. at 988 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet 
Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4822 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of 
proposed rulemaking)). 




The question . . . is whether the transmission component of cable modem 
service is sufficiently integrated with the finished service to make it 
reasonable to describe the two as a single, integrated offering.  We think 
that they are sufficiently integrated . . . . Such functionally integrated 
components need not be described as distinct “offerings.”60 
 
Justice Thomas concluded that, because of ambiguities in the statutory language, it was 
permissible for the FCC to determine that the transmission component of cable modem 
service was sufficiently integrated with the complete service it offered such that it was 
reasonable to describe the combination as a single, integrated offering that constituted an 
information service with no separate offering of a telecommunications service.61 
 
Applying Chevron’s second step, the Court concluded that the FCC’s construction 
was reasonable.62  It rejected the argument that the FCC’s construction was unreasonable 
because it would allow Internet communications providers to evade common carriage 
obligations historically imposed on other conduits for communication.63  It also rejected 
the argument that the FCC’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious because it left 
providers of broadband Internet access via DSL subject to common carriage requirements 
while removing such requirements from cable broadband providers.64  The Court held 
that the FCC enjoyed the discretion gradually to alter telecommunications policy so as to 
eventually exempt the provision of all broadband Internet access from common carriage 
requirements.65  As a consolation to open access and net neutrality advocates, however, 
the Court concluded that the FCC “remains free to impose special regulatory duties on 
[broadband providers] under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”66   
 
 Justice Scalia, dissenting, offered a harsh critique of the FCC’s interpretation and 
newly-proclaimed (and seemingly unconstrained) freedom to regulate broadband 
providers under its ancillary jurisdiction.67  Scalia’s critique anticipates the problems 
inherent in the FCC’s recent exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction in the Comcast order.68  
According to Justice Scalia, cable broadband providers clearly offer telecommunications 
services and to hold otherwise and permit them to evade common carriage obligations 
was nonsensical.69  He rejected the interpretation advanced by the FCC: that cable 
broadband providers’ bundling of telecommunications services with value-added services 
meant that they should not be classified as providers of telecommunications services: 
                                                 
60 Id. at 989-91 (citations omitted). 
61 Id. at 990-91. 
62 Id. at 997. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1000-02. 
65 Id. at 1002. 
66 Id. at 996. 
67 Id. at 1013-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 Id.  See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order) 
(holding that Comcast’s “discriminatory and arbitrary practice . . . does not constitute reasonable 
network management,” and ordering Comcast to cease such practice).   
69 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1006-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The relevant question is whether the individual components in a 
package being offered still possess sufficient identity to be 
described as separate objects of the offer, or whether they have 
been so changed by their combination with the other 
components that it is no longer reasonable to describe them in 
that way. 
. . .  There are instances in which it is ridiculous to deny that 
one part of a joint offering is being offered merely because it is 
not offered on a “‘stand-alone’” basis.  
If, for example, I call up a pizzeria and ask whether they offer 
delivery, both common sense and common “usage” would 
prevent them from answering: “No, we do not offer delivery—
but if you order a pizza from us, we’ll bake it for you and then 
bring it to your house.”  The logical response to this would be 
something on the order of, “so, you do offer delivery.”  But our 
pizza-man may continue to deny the obvious and explain, 
paraphrasing the FCC and the Court: “No, even though we 
bring the pizza to your house, we are not actually ‘offering’ you 
delivery, because the delivery that we provide to our end users 
is ‘part and parcel’ of our pizzeria-pizza-at-home service and is 
‘integral to its other capabilities.’”  Any reasonable customer 
would conclude at that point that his interlocutor was either 
crazy or following some too-clever-by-half legal advice. 
 . . . . 
Despite the Court’s mighty labors to prove otherwise, the 
telecommunications component of cable-modem service retains 
such ample independent identity that it must be regarded as 
being on [sic] offer –especially when seen from the perspective 
of the consumer or the end user. 70 
In other words, even though cable broadband providers provide some information services 
in addition to the telecommunications services they offer, it was irrational to conclude that 
there is no separately identifiable offering of telecommunications service that is subject to 
common carriage regulation.   
 
 The discretion that the FCC purported to reserve to regulate the provision of 
broadband Internet services under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction was also subjected to 
Justice Scalia’s trenchant criticism: 
 
                                                 
70 Id. at 1006-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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This [unfettered ancillary jurisdiction] is a wonderful 
illustration of how an experienced agency can (with some 
assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into 
bureaucratic discretions.  The main source of the Commission’s 
regulatory authority over common carriers is Title II, but the 
Commission has rendered that inapplicable in this instance by 
concluding that the definition of “telecommunications service” 
is ambiguous and does not (in its current view) apply to cable-
modem service. It contemplates, however, altering that 
(unnecessary) outcome, not by changing the law (i.e., its 
construction of the Title II definitions), but by reserving the 
right to change the facts.  Under its undefined and sparingly 
used “ancillary” powers, the Commission might conclude that it 
can order cable companies to “unbundle” the 
telecommunications component of cable-modem service.  And 
presto, Title II will then apply to them, because they will finally 
be “offering” telecommunications service! . . . Such Möbius-
strip reasoning mocks the principle that the statute constrains 
the agency in any meaningful way.71 
 
Within three years of the Brand X decision, the FCC determined that it indeed enjoyed 
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate a cable broadband provider.72  Below, I explore the 
actions of the FCC and of broadband providers that led to this result, as well as the 
problems arising from the FCC’s exercise of this unconstrained ancillary jurisdiction. 
 
After the Brand X decision, the FCC removed common carriage regulations from 
every other type of broadband provider,73 as the Court’s opinion authorized it to do.74  
One month after Brand X was handed down, the FCC ruled that the provision of 
broadband Internet access via DSL, like cable broadband, was also an “information 
service,” and therefore that telephone companies’ provision of broadband Internet access 
via DSL would be exempt from common carriage requirements.75  The FCC subsequently 
ruled that all other types of broadband are likewise exempt from common 
carriage/nondiscrimination regulations.76  Thus, under the Telecommunications Act, 
                                                 
71 Id. at 1013-14. 
72 See Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13034-36. 
73 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14853, 14858 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order] (report and order and 
notice of proposed rulemaking).  See also NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at 126 (discussing the 
Wireline Broadband Order).  
74 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002-03. 
75 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 73, at 14858.  For transition purposes, the Wireline 
Broadband Order required DSL providers to “continue to provide existing wireline broadband 
Internet access transmission offerings, on a grandfathered basis, to unaffiliated ISPs” for one year 
after the date of the order’s publication of September 23, 2005.  Id. 
76 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 73, at 14858.  See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Neither Fish nor 
Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 373 (2008). 
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decisions about what expression to censor and what expression to facilitate were left to 
solely to the discretion of the companies providing broadband Internet access—for most 
residential Internet users, the cable/telephone duopoly.77   
 
The FCC’s 2005 Broadband Policy Statement  
 
When the FCC exempted DSL providers from common carriage/non-
discrimination obligations, at least one of the FCC Commissioners was troubled by the 
implications of this course of action.  Commissioner Michael Copps, a long-time 
advocate of net neutrality principles, managed to prevail upon his colleagues to adopt a 
statement of broadband policy setting forth Internet users’ basic rights.78  Accordingly, 
shortly after the Brand X decision, on the same day that it exempted DSL providers from 
common carriage requirements, the FCC Commissioners issued a Broadband Policy 
Statement (Policy Statement) setting forth four principles regarding consumers’ access 
to the Internet: 
 
• consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their 
choice[;] 
 
• . . . consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of  law enforcement[;] 
 
• . . . consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices 
that do not harm the network[;]  
 
• . . . consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers, and content providers.79  
 
The legal force of these principles is unclear, and the uncertain status of the 
principles further contributes to the uncertainty surrounding the FCC’s recent actions 
regulating broadband providers to ensure their compliance with these principles.  On one 
hand, in the Policy Statement, the FCC recognized that it has “a duty to preserve and 
                                                 
77 According to the FCC’s 2006 data, about ninety-five percent of all residential broadband is 
provided by the cable/telephone duopoly.  See INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY 
DIVISION,  WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES 
FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2006 9 tbl.3, chart 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.masstech.org/broadband/FCC07data.pdf. 
78 See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13078 (2008) (Copps, Comm’r, concurring) 
(memorandum opinion and order) (“[After the Brand X decision gave the Supreme Court’s stamp 
of approval on the 2002 Declaratory Ruling], the Commission was more interested in re-
categorizing telecommunications services as information services and eliminating many of the 
social and economic responsibilities of broadband service providers.  I urged my colleagues to at 
least adopt an Internet Policy Statement that contained the basic rights of Internet end-users . . . 
.”). 
79 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005) [hereinafter Policy Statement] (policy statement). 
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promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet as the telecommunications 
marketplace enters the broadband age,” and, in order to do so, promised to “incorporate 
the above principles into its ongoing policymaking activities.”80  In so doing, the FCC 
arguably provided notice to broadband providers of its intent to adjudicate or enact rules 
in accord with these policies.  The FCC made clear that if it encountered “evidence that 
providers of telecommunications for Internet access . . . are violating these principles, [it 
would] not hesitate to take action to address that conduct.”81  Indeed, the FCC and others 
opposed to net neutrality legislation have referred to the FCC’s power to enforce these 
principles to support the argument that net neutrality legislation is unnecessary.82 
 
On the other hand, the FCC expressly stated that in adopting the Policy Statement, 
it was not adopting formal rules.83 The principles set forth in the Broadband Policy 
Statement were rendered even fuzzier by the FCC’s caveat that the rights of Internet users 
articulated therein were “subject to reasonable network management”84 by broadband 
providers (without any articulation of what types of deviations from the principles would 
be excused as “reasonable network management”).  As such, the Policy Statement 
appears to embody a compromise among different factions of the FCC regarding the legal 
force and effect of the rights and principles it embodies.  After the release of the Policy 
Statement, it was unclear exactly how (if at all) the FCC would enforce the rights 
articulated in the Policy Statement. 
 
The FCC’s First (and Incomplete) Steps Toward Broadband Rulemaking 
 
Two years after it adopted the Broadband Policy Statement, the FCC took 
preliminary steps toward a formal rulemaking that would set forth a regulatory 
framework applicable to providers of broadband Internet access.  In 2007, the FCC 
adopted a Broadband Industry Practices Notice of Inquiry—typically the first step in a 
rulemaking proceeding—designed to determine whether to articulate broadly-applicable 
and enforceable net neutrality rules governing network management practices, to 
elucidate the scope of its authority to regulate broadband providers, and to develop a 
factual record on which to determine whether such rules were necessary.85  In particular, 
the FCC sought inquiry on the following matters: 
[W]e seek to enhance our understanding of the nature of the market for 
broadband and related services, whether network platform providers and 
others favor or disfavor particular content, how consumers are affected by 
                                                 
80 Id.  Further, the FCC subsequently asked merging companies to agree to be bound by the 
principles articulated in the Policy Statement.  See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 20 F.C.C.R. 
18433, 18509 (2005) (memorandum opinion and order) (noting in review of an application for 
merger between Verizon Communications, Inc., and MCI, Inc., that both companies would abide 
by the principles set forth in the Policy Statement). 
81 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 72, at 14904. 
82  
83 Policy Statement, supra note 78, at 14988 n.15. 
84 Id. 
85 See Broadband Industry Practices, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, 7896-98 (2007) (notice of inquiry).   
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these policies, and whether consumer choice of broadband providers is 
sufficient to ensure that all such policies ultimately benefit consumers.  
We ask for specific examples of beneficial or harmful behavior, and we 
ask whether any regulatory intervention is necessary. 
. . . . 
We seek a fuller understanding of the behavior of broadband market 
participants today . . . [D]o providers treat different packets in different 
ways?  How and why?  Are these providers operating consistent with the 
[FCC’s 2005 Broadband] Policy Statement? . . . Do providers deprioritize 
or block packets containing material that is harmful to their commercial 
interests, or prioritize packets relating to applications or services in which 
they have a commercial interest?  
 
. . . . 
 
We next ask whether the Policy Statement should be amended. . . . 
[A]re there specific changes to the Policy Statement that commenters 
would recommend?  We also ask whether we should incorporate a new 
principle of nondiscrimination.  If so, how would “nondiscrimination” be 
defined, and how would such a principle read?  Would it permit any 
exclusive or preferential arrangements among network platform or access 
providers and content providers?  
 
Finally, does the Commission have the legal authority to enforce the 
Policy Statement in the face of particular market failures or other specific 
problems? . . . Assuming it is not necessary to adopt rules at this time, 
what market characteristics would justify the adoption of rules?86 
 
In asking for comments on this list of network neutrality related questions, the FCC 
presumably indicated that it intended to consider the broad range of responses in 
engaging in rulemaking on net neutrality issues.  Although the FCC received a substantial 
number of comments in response to these questions, it never progressed toward a 
rulemaking and never issued a notice of proposed rulemaking.  Instead, as discussed 
below, the FCC chose to proceed via informal adjudication under its seemingly 
unfettered ancillary jurisdiction in its August 2008 order regarding Comcast’s 
discriminatory network practices.87 
 
Proposed Net Neutrality Legislation   
 
Meanwhile, beginning in 2006, troubled by the potential implications of 
the FCC’s removal of common carriage obligations form broadband providers, 
open access and net neutrality advocates “prevailed upon members of Congress to 
                                                 
86 Id. at 7894-98. 
87 See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13034-36 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order). 
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introduce network neutrality legislation.”88  Such legislation would prohibit 
broadband providers from discriminating against legal content or applications in 
the form of blocking, prioritizing, or degrading such content or applications.89  
The most speech-protective of the proposed legislation would prohibit providers 
from blocking, impairing, degrading, or discriminating against the ability of any 
person to use a broadband connection to access the content or services available 
on broadband networks.90   
 
Other proposed net neutrality legislation, such as the Communications 
Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement (COPE) Act of 2006,91 would not directly 
prohibit broadband providers from discriminating against content or applications, but 
would grant the FCC explicit authority to adjudicate consumer complaints regarding 
discrimination and to enforce the principles articulated in the 2005 Broadband Policy 
Statement.92  Presumably, the supporters of the COPE Act believed that the FCC does not 
currently enjoy such authority and therefore must be granted such authority in order to 
adjudicate net neutrality-related complaints.  
 
 None of the federal network neutrality bills was passed as of September 2009.  
For the time being, it appears that net neutrality advocates will enjoy greater success 
advancing their cause with the FCC than with Congress, as I consider in Part II. 
 
II. The Comcast Adjudication and the FCC’s Regulatory About-Face 
 
In the fall of 2007, Internet users began to suspect that Comcast, the nation’s 
second largest broadband provider, was blocking and otherwise discriminating against 
legal file-sharing applications.93  With the help of the public interest organizations Free 
                                                 
88 NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at 131. 
89 See Network Neutrality Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr5273ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr5273ih.pdf. 
90 See id.; see also Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. 
(2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr5417RH/pdf/BILLS-
109hr5417RH.pdf (prohibiting broadband Internet providers from interfering with users’ ability 
to choose the lawful content, services, and applications they wish to access). 
91 H.R. 5252, 109th Cong., available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
109hr5252IH/pdf/BILLS-109hr5252IH.pdf (as introduced in House, May 1, 2006). 
92 See id.  In early 2008, Representatives Edward Markey and Charles Pickering introduced The 
Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, which would, among other things: (1) establish that it 
is the United States’s national broadband policy “to maintain the freedom to use . . . broadband . . 
. networks . . . without unreasonable interference from or discrimination by network operators” 
and to safeguard against unreasonable discrimination and degradation of content based on source, 
ownership, or destination; and (2) require the FCC to assess broadband services and consumer 
rights via a series of public broadband summits and report back to Congress on its findings.  
Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5353, 110th Cong. (2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr5353ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr5353ih.pdf.    
93  See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation For Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications at 5, Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (No. FCC 08-183) 
(memorandum opinion and order), available at 
http://www.freepress.net/files/fp_pk_comcast_complaint.pdf. 
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Press and Public Knowledge, users were able to confirm their suspicions and establish 
that Comcast was blocking and degrading the protocols employed by BitTorrent, an open 
source program used for quickly distributing large files.94  The question then became: 
was Comcast doing anything illegal?  If so, what law was it violating?  As the provider of 
an “information service,” Comcast was subject neither to common 
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations, nor to the FCC’s regulatory oversight under Title 
II of the Communications Act.95  Although Comcast’s actions arguably violated the 
Broadband Policy Statement, FCC Chairman Martin had made clear that the principles 
articulated in the Statement were not “rules” or otherwise “enforceable documents.”96  
Furthermore, it was not clear how one could frame a complaint alleging a violation of the 
Broadband Policy Statement, even assuming its principles were enforceable.  While 
violations of Title II common carriage obligations could be alleged via “Formal 
Complaints,”97 the FCC had not established mechanisms for bringing to its attention 
violations of the Broadband Policy Statement.   
 
Undaunted by these procedural uncertainties, in November 2007, Free Press and 
Public Knowledge asked the FCC to undertake an investigation into Comcast’s 
discriminatory network management practices.  They framed their allegations in the form 
of a Formal Complaint and Petition for a Declaratory Ruling (notwithstanding the fact 
that Formal Complaints were intended for allegations of Title II violations), and alleged 
that Comcast was degrading and blocking peer-to-peer file-sharing applications and 
withholding information about these actions from Internet subscribers.98  They alleged 
that, beginning in August 2007, certain Comcast Internet subscribers who sought to use 
peer-to-peer file-sharing applications such as BitTorrent noticed that their file transfers 
were being cut off and/or severely degraded by Comcast.99  When these users 
complained, Comcast flatly denied that it was blocking, degrading, or otherwise 
“shaping” any traffic on its network and blamed the problems that users were 
experiencing on the users themselves and on the BitTorrent protocol.100  In October 2007, 
however, the Associated Press (AP), together with the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF), produced clear evidence that Comcast had indeed degraded and blocked a variety 
                                                 
94 See id. at  6-7. 
95 See text accompanying note 19. 
96 See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Chairman Kevin  J. Martin Comments on 
Comm’n Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf. 
97 See 47 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). 
98 See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation For 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 93, at 5-11; Petition of Free Press et al. 
for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy 
Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network Management” at 7-14, 
Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (No. FCC 08-183) (memorandum opinion and order), 
available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network_management/fp_et_al_nn_declaratory_ruling.pdf. 
99 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation For 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 93, at 5. 
100 Posting of Seth Schoen to Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/09/comcast-
and-bittorrent (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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of peer-to-peer applications, including those using BitTorrent, Gnutella, FTP, and even 
Lotus Notes’s software suite (which is routinely used by businesses to share email, 
calendars, and other files).101  In particular, AP reported problems in using BitTorrent to 
download copies of the King James Bible from a computer with a Comcast cable 
modem.102  EFF, upon further investigation, found that Comcast was employing network 
management tools to cause peer-to-peer connections to shut down,103 and intentionally 
configuring its network to jam such traffic and to make it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for its subscribers to use such applications.104  
 
Furthermore, Comcast’s method of jamming such applications was designed to hide 
from users the fact that it was Comcast itself that was taking actions to discriminate 
against such applications.105  When a Comcast user attempted to send packets to others 
using certain file-sharing applications, Comcast shut down the connection between that 
user and other non-Comcast users by “hacking into its own network and using a 
clandestine ‘man in the middle’ tactic whereby each party is sent a communication ‘RST’ 
(reset) message which falsely tells the other party to shut down the connection.”106 As a 
result of such interference, each affected user’s computer received a message invisible to 
the user that looked like it came from another, peer computer instructing it to stop 
communicating. “But neither message originated from the other computer—it comes 
from Comcast.”107  As one commentator characterized Comcast’s interference, “[i]f it 
were a telephone conversation, it would be like the operator breaking into the 
conversation, telling each talker in the voice of the other: ‘Sorry, I have to hang up.  
Good bye.’”108  
 
Free Press and Public Knowledge claimed that Comcast’s action violated the 
principles articulated in the Broadband Policy Statement, especially Internet users’ 
freedom “to access the lawful Internet content of their choice” and to “run applications 
and use services of their choice.”109  Comcast eventually acknowledged that it purposely 
slowed down some traffic on its network, including some music and movie downloads, 
but claimed that it should be permitted to do so in order to direct traffic to prevent 
                                                 
101 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation For 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 93, at 6-7. 
102 See id. at 9. 
103  PETER ECKERSLEY ET AL., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, PACKET FORGERY BY ISPS: 
A REPORT ON THE COMCAST AFFAIR 1-2 (2007), http://www.eff.org/files/ 
eff_comcast_report.pdf. 
104 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation For 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, supra note 93, at 9. 
105 Id. 
106 Vuze, Inc., Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by 
Broadband Network Operators at 10, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Nov. 14, 2007) (petition for 
rulemaking), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/vuze-petition-20071114.pdf. 
107 Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, MSNBC, Oct. 19, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/. 
108 Id. 
109 Policy Statement, supra note 79, at 14988. 
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network clogs.110  It argued that its actions fell within the “reasonable network 
management” exception to the freedoms guaranteed to users under the Policy 
Statement,111 which, Comcast argued, the Commission recognized was necessary “‘for 
the good of all customers.’”112   
 
The FCC’s Order 
 
 In its August 1, 2008 informal adjudication on this matter, the FCC sided with the 
Internet users.113  The FCC first concluded that it indeed enjoyed jurisdiction to rule on 
this matter.114  After establishing its authority to adjudicate, the FCC found that 
Comcast’s actions violated the Broadband Policy Statement and did not fall within the 
Statement’s exception for “reasonable network management.”115  It concluded that 
Comcast’s network management practices were discriminatory and not reasonably 
tailored to address Comcast’s concerns about network congestion.116  It found further that 
Comcast had an anti-competitive motive to engage in such discrimination, as the file-
sharing applications against which it discriminated posed a competitive threat to 
Comcast’s own video-on-demand service.117  The FCC also found that Comcast’s 
disclosures to its subscribers regarding its discriminatory actions were wholly inadequate 
and that subscribers could not possibly have learned from Comcast’s disclosures that 
such discrimination was occurring.118  I analyze each of these conclusions below.  
 
As a threshold matter, the FCC declared that it enjoyed the broad, general 
authority to enforce “federal Internet policy,” which encompassed the power to 
adjudicate the present dispute between Free Press and Comcast.119  It grounded its 
authority to adjudicate in the broad outlines of federal Internet policy articulated by 
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in particular, the general policy of 
“encourag[ing] the development of technologies [that] maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals . . . who use the Internet.”120  Second, the FCC 
explained that when it promulgated its Broadband Policy Statement in 2005, it clearly 
asserted its responsibility for enforcing this federal Internet policy.121  In elaborating 
upon this policy, the Broadband Policy Statement made clear that the FCC intended to 
                                                 
110 See Grant Gross, EFF:Comcast Continues to Block P-to-P, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/30/AR2007113001543.html. 
111 See Policy Statement, supra note 79, at 14988 n.15. 
112 Ryan Paul, FCC to Investigate Comcast BitTorrent Blocking, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 8, 2008, 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080108-fcc-to-investigate-comcast-bittorrent-
blocking.html. 
113 Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order). 
114 Id. at 13034-44. 
115 Id. at 13058. 
116 Id. at 13054-56. 
117 Id. at 13030. 
118 Id. at 13059.  
119 Id. at 13045. 
120  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
121 Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R at 13034. 
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“preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet,”122 and 
to “preserve and promote the vibrant and open character of the Internet as the 
telecommunications marketplace enters the broadband age.”123  In furtherance of those 
goals, the FCC expressly instructed broadband providers that they would be required to 
ensure that their users enjoyed the freedom to “run applications and use services of their 
choice” and to “access the lawful Internet content of their choice.”124  Furthermore, when 
it adopted the Broadband Policy Statement, the FCC warned that if it was presented with 
“evidence that providers of telecommunications for Internet access . . . [were] violating 
these principles, [it would] not hesitate to take action to address that conduct.”125 
 
 The FCC further defended its jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute by referring 
back to the Brand X decision itself, in which the Supreme Court dismissed criticisms of 
the FCC’s decision to exempt broadband providers from common carriage regulations by 
explaining that the FCC would retain the power to impose regulatory obligations on 
broadband providers “under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and 
foreign communications.”126  Under such Title I authority, the FCC explained, it enjoyed 
broad authority and jurisdiction over “communication by wire,” including over 
Comcast’s provision of broadband Internet access.127  In response to the argument that 
the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction must be reasonably ancillary to the effective performance 
of something in particular, the FCC explained that that “something” is the federal Internet 
policy set forth in the Telecommunications Act.128  The FCC then articulated a host of 
other provisions of the Communications Act to which its jurisdiction was also 
ancillary.129 
 
 Turning to the means it selected to define the contours of national Internet policy 
in general and net neutrality norms in particular—via informal adjudication instead of via 
rulemaking—the FCC acknowledged the Supreme Court’s mandate130 that it “fill[] in the 
interstices of the [Telecommunications Act,] . . . as much as possible, through th[e] quasi-
legislative promulgation of rules” rather than by case-by-case adjudication.131  It 
defended its decision to proceed via adjudication in this case by adverting to the novel, 
complex, and variegated nature of Internet traffic management issues, which rendered 
case-by-case adjudication preferable to one-size-fits-all rules.132  Moreover, in 
furtherance of the national Internet policy set forth in the Telecommunications Act that 
                                                 
122 Policy Statement, supra note 79, at 14988 (emphasis in original). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 73, at 14904. 
126 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005). 
127 Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13035 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 13036-40. 
130 Id. at 13045. 
131 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (emphasis added). 
132 Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13046. 
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“‘broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment,’”133 the FCC 
claimed that proceeding via case-by-case adjudication established a comparatively less 
burdensome regulatory environment for broadband providers.134  
 
 In addressing the merits of Free Press’s complaint, the FCC found that Comcast’s 
network management practices unlawfully discriminated among applications and 
protocols by using deep packet inspection technology to peer into Internet users’ 
communications and terminate communications based on their content.135  The FCC 
found that Comcast terminated certain connections when it determined that there were 
too many peer-to-peer uploads by sending RST (reset) packets to interrupt and terminate 
these communications.136  It held that Comcast’s use of deep packet inspection 
technology and Reset Injection was unreasonable, constituted discriminatory censorship 
in violation of the principles articulated in the Broadband Policy Statement, and was not 
“carefully tailored to [Comcast’s] interest in easing network congestion.”137  In particular, 
Comcast’s network practices were overinclusive—not targeting all Internet users who 
used substantial bandwidth, but only those who used disfavored applications, regardless 
of the level of overall network congestion at the time or whether the user’s particular 
geographic area had congested nodes.138  Comcast’s network practices were also 
underinclusive, in that even an Internet user using an extraordinary amount of bandwidth 
would be left alone by Comcast as long as he or she was not using a disfavored 
application like BitTorrent.139  Applying a form of strict scrutiny to Comcast’s network 
management practices, the FCC went on to find that Comcast had alternative avenues to 
advance its legitimate network management goals that were less restrictive of expression, 
including capping individual users’ bandwidth consumption and/or charging overage fees 
to high capacity users, instead of punishing anyone who uses disfavored peer-to-peer 
technology.140 
 
Finally, the FCC sharply rebuked Comcast for failing to disclose its network 
management practices to affected Internet users to the FCC itself.141  To remedy this lack 
of meaningful disclosure, the FCC ordered Comcast to:  
 
(1) disclose to the Commission the precise contours of the network 
management practices [it was employing] . . . ; (2) submit a 
compliance plan . . . that describes how it intends to transition from 
discriminatory to nondiscriminatory network management practices 
by the end of [2008]; and (3) disclose to the Commission and the 
                                                 
133 Id. at 13046 (quoting Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed 
rulemaking)). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 13050-51. 
136 Id. at 13051. 
137 Id. at 13056. 
138 Id. 
139  Id. at 13056-57. 
140  Id. at 13057. 
141 Id. at 13058-59. 
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public the details of the network management practices that it 
intends to deploy following the termination of its current practices, 
including the thresholds that will trigger any limits on customers’ 
access to bandwidth.142  
 
The FCC, however, declined to adopt generally applicable disclosure requirements—or 
any other requirements—regarding network management practices for broadband 
providers generally,143 limiting itself to imposing these mandates on Comcast in 
particular. The FCC concluded by retaining continuing jurisdiction over this matter and 
by urging Free Press and members of the public generally to “keep a watchful eye on 
Comcast as it carries out this relief.” 144 
 
Chairman Kevin J. Martin’s Concurring Statement 
 
 While concurring generally with the FCC’s order, FCC Chairman Martin was 
more willing to articulate broadly-applicable rules for broadband providers and set forth 
these rules in a way similar to that applicable under First Amendment scrutiny.  He 
explained that the FCC was “ready, willing, and able” to enforce the net neutrality 
principles articulated in its Broadband Policy Statement, 145 and would conduct its 
analysis of whether a broadband provider violated these principles as follows: first, the 
FCC would consider “whether the network management practice [was] intended to 
distinguish between legal and illegal activity,” such as child pornography or copyright-
infringing content.146  Next, it would consider whether the broadband service provider 
had “adequately disclosed its network management practices,” both because Internet 
users should be able to rely upon such disclosure so they can make informed decisions 
about their choice of broadband provider and because lack of full disclosure is strong 
evidence that the practice is unreasonable. 147  Finally, if the FCC were to determine that 
the broadband provider arbitrarily degraded or blocked legal content under the guise of 
“network management,” it would apply a version of intermediate scrutiny to determine 
whether the network management practice “further[ed] an important interest and [was] 
carefully tailored to serve that interest.”148 
 
 Applying this analysis, Commissioner Martin had no difficulty concluding that 
Comcast’s discriminatory blocking of BitTorrent and similar applications was 
unreasonable and unlawful.  As he explained,  
 
If we aren’t going to stop a company that is looking inside its subscribers’ 
communications (reading the “packets” they send), blocking that 
communication when it uses a particular application regardless of whether 
                                                 
142  Id. at 13060. 
143  Id. at 13046, 13058. 
144 Id. at 13061. 
145 Id. at 13065 (Martin, Chairman, concurring). 




there is congestion on the network, hiding what it is doing by making 
consumers think the problem is their own, and lying about it to the public, 
what would we stop?  Failure to act here would have reasonably led to the 
conclusion that new legislation and rules are necessary.149   
 
Because the Commission was “ready, willing and able” to regulate such bad practices by 
broadband providers on an informal, ad hoc basis, neither formal rulemaking nor broadly 
applicable net neutrality legislation was necessary, according to Martin.150 
 
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell’s Dissent 
 
 Commissioner McDowell disagreed with the majority of FCC 
Commissioners regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction to adjudicate in these 
circumstances.  He explained that, “[s]ince the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brand X, we have been busy taking broadband services out of the common 
carriage realm of Title II and classifying them as largely unregulated Title I 
information services.”151  Accordingly, with respect to Comcast, he concluded, 
“we do not have any rules governing Internet network management to enforce.”152  
He emphasized that the Broadband Policy Statement principles were not intended 
to serve as enforceable rules, and that the FCC had clearly contemplated a 
rulemaking proceeding regarding network management practices, as was 
evidenced by its adoption of the Broadband Industry Practices Notice of Inquiry 
in 2007, the first step in a rulemaking proceeding.153  As McDowell complained, 
“no notice of proposed rulemaking, with a chance for public comment, was ever 
issued.  Nothing regulating Internet network governance has been codified in the 
Code of Federal Regulations.  In short, we have no rules to enforce.”154   
 
  McDowell also sharply criticized the majority’s broad conception of the 
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, under which “the Commission apparently can do 
anything so long as it frames its actions in terms of promoting the Internet or 
broadband deployment.”155  He also observed that members of Congress 
apparently believed that the FCC did not enjoy the jurisdiction to regulate 
broadband providers’ network management practices and accordingly sought 
(unsuccessfully, so far) to enact net neutrality legislation that would grant the 
FCC such jurisdiction.156 
 
  In summary, the FCC Commissioners were sharply divided in their 
understanding of whether the FCC had the power to adjudicate in the Comcast 
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incident, whether the FCC had rules to enforce against Comcast, how the FCC 
(and Congress) should proceed in the future in protecting Internet users’ freedom 
to communicate, and what level of scrutiny it should apply to allegations of 
discrimination by broadband providers. 
 
Process-Based Criticisms of the FCC’s Approach 
 
 The FCC’s approach to regulation of broadband providers in its Comcast order is 
insufficient to protect Internet users’ free speech rights and is vulnerable to attack on 
several fronts.   First, as a procedural matter, there are strong arguments that an agency 
cannot enforce a policy statement (especially one that it itself declared unenforceable)157 
that did not emerge from a notice-and-comment rulemaking.158  As discussed above, FCC 
Chairman Martin made clear when adopting the Broadband Policy Statement that “policy 
statements do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents.”159  Courts have 
held that agencies “cannot apply or rely upon [such nonbinding policy statements] as law 
because a general statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish 
as policy.”160  Although agencies enjoy the discretion to act via adjudication instead of 
via rulemaking, such adjudications must enforce previously articulated rules or binding 
principles.  In its Comcast adjudication, the FCC did neither. 
 
 Second, the FCC’s adjudication is subject to criticism on the grounds that it relied 
entirely on a paper record composed of predominantly self-serving statements by the 
parties themselves or other interested parties that were not subject to penalties of perjury 
or cross-examination.  As Commissioner McDowell complained in his dissent,  
 
[a]ll we have to rely on are the apparently unsigned declarations of three 
individuals representing the complainant’s view, some press reports, and 
the conflicting declaration of a Comcast employee.  The rest of the record 
consists purely of differing opinions and conjecture . . . [The Commission 
should instead have] conduct[ed] its own factual investigation under its 
enforcement powers.”161   
 
The agency’s informal adjudication in Comcast differs markedly from the formal 
adjudication mode that is available to the FCC, in which adjudications are held before 
one of the FCC’s two full-time administrative law judges, employ a trial and investigative 
                                                 
157 See supra text accompanying note 96. 
158 See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 6 (manuscript at 32) (“[A]n agency cannot enforce a policy 
statement that did not emerge from notice-and-comment rulemaking or explicitly warn parties 
that it would be enforced.”). 
159 Press Release, Chairman Kevin  J. Martin, surpa note 96. 
160 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis 
added).  See also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 407 (2007) (arguing that agencies “cannot base an 
enforcement action solely on a regulated entity’s noncompliance with a guidance document.”). 
161 Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13092 (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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staff that is separate from the FCC, and have a variety of procedural requirements.162  The 
processes attendant to formal adjudications alleviate many of the concerns inherent in 
informal adjudications.  As Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai explain,  
 
the trial-type context of formal adjudications, with the parties 
presenting evidence and rebutting their opponents’ evidence and 
with the hearing officer’s decision based solely on the material 
presented at the hearing, alleviates the fear of powerful interests 
presenting arguments privately to the decisionmaker and more 
generally reduces concerns about bias affecting the agency’s 
decision.163  
 
Because the FCC failed to employ formal adjudication and instead employed a mode of 
informal adjudication in which it purported to enforce principles and policies it had 
previously labeled “non-enforceable,” its process is flawed in many respects. 
 
Although the decision reached by the FCC reprimanding Comcast appears to be 
an important step in the right direction, across-the-board regulation of broadband 
providers in the form of either legislation or agency rulemaking—both of which were 
opposed by a majority of the FCC Commissioners164—is necessary to ensure that 
discrimination against content does not occur in the first place.  While post hoc 
reprimands specifically directed toward one particular company are an important 
indication of the FCC’s current approach toward net discrimination, they do not obviate 
the need for broadly applicable, ex ante regulation.   
 
III. Too Little, Too Late:  The FCC’s Adjudication Actions are Insufficient to Protect 
Internet Users’ Freedom of Expression 
 
The Case For Net Neutrality Regulation 
 
Instead of engaging in ad hoc, informal adjudication as an exercise of its ancillary 
jurisdiction, the FCC should have concluded back in 2002 that broadband providers were 
common carriers that were subject at least to nondiscrimination obligations under Title II 
of the Communications Act.  Congress has the power, in effect, to undo the FCC’s 
decision to exempt broadband providers from common carriage obligations and to subject 
broadband providers to the nondiscrimination requirements imposed upon common 
carriers under Title II.165  As I argue in greater detail in Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality 
                                                 
162 See Weiser, supra note 6 (manuscript at 51-52 & nn.177-79). 
163 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can 
Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 313 (2007). 
164 FCC Chairman Martin, for example, made clear in his concurrence with the Comcast Order 
that he has “consistently opposed calls for legislation or rules to impose network neutrality.”  
Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13067 (Martin, Chairman, concurring). 
165 Such obligations could be imposed by net neutrality legislation.  See supra text accompanying notes 88–
92. 
 24 
and Free Speech in the Internet Age,166 in the absence of common carriage obligations 
imposed on broadband providers, carefully crafted net neutrality legislation is necessary 
to protect our free speech interests in the Internet age.  Congress enjoys the power to 
regulate—or to require the FCC to regulate—broadband providers so as to subject them 
to the obligation not to discriminate against the content members of the public seek to 
communicate.167  Such regulation would advance the free speech interests of members of 
the public and would not infringe the First Amendment rights of broadband providers. 
 
 Even assuming that broadband providers enjoy a protectable First Amendment 
interest in the functions they perform, net neutrality regulations prohibiting broadband 
providers from engaging in discrimination against legal content or applications would be 
deemed content-neutral regulations of speech that survive the applicable intermediate 
scrutiny.  Courts’ analyses of the constitutionality of such regulation would be similar to 
the analysis the FCC itself imposed in its Comcast adjudication.168  Such regulation 
would advance the substantial government interest of protecting the public’s access to 
information and, if the regulation were carefully crafted and appropriately tailored to 
advance this interest, it would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.169  Consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,170 in which the 
Court recognized the limited First Amendment editorial rights of the cable companies 
while upholding regulations requiring them to serve as conduits for content that was not 
of their choosing,171 carefully crafted regulation of broadband providers prohibiting them 
from unreasonably discriminating against legal content or applications comports with the 
First Amendment’s protections.  Thus, even if broadband providers were able to convince 
a court that their First Amendment interests were implicated by net neutrality regulation, 
Turner would counsel in favor of holding that such interests were outweighed by the 
countervailing public interest in “‘the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources’”172 and in “public discussion and informed deliberation 
[that] . . . democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to 
achieve.”173   
 
Any regulation prohibiting broadband providers from blocking legal content or 
applications should also mandate transparency in any such blocking—much like the FCC 
mandated in its Comcast adjudication174—requiring broadband providers to inform their 
                                                 
166 NUNZIATO, supra note 7. 
167 Such requirements could be imposed by net neutrality legislation.  See supra text accompanying notes 
88–92.  
168  See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.  
169 See Letter from Tim Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, 
Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Aug. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.freepress.net/files/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
170 520 U.S. 180 (1997).  See NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at ch. 7 (discussing Turner and its 
implications for the judicial scrutiny of net neutrality legislation). 
171 Turner, 520 U.S. at 224. 
172 Id. at 192 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994)). 
173 Id. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
174  See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.  
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subscribers when content and/or applications are blocked and the reasons for such 
blocking (e.g., the provider claims that the content that was blocked constituted illegal 
child pornography or copyright infringing works).  Mandating transparency in blocking 
will enable users to impose meaningful checks on the blocking decisions of broadband 
providers and ensure that such blocking does not mask the provider’s unlawful 
discrimination.  It is currently quite difficult, if not impossible, for users to discern 
whether content or applications have been blocked (as was evident in the case of 
Comcast’s discriminatory actions).  Indeed, lack of transparency will only compound the 
discrimination because users—or, as in Comcast’s case, the broadband provider175—may 
attribute the difficulties in access to the blocked content or applications themselves, 
instead of placing the blame where it belongs—with their broadband provider.  Internet 
users enjoy the right to be informed that content or applications have been blocked by 
their providers and the reasons for such blocking so they can impose meaningful checks 
on broadband providers’ discriminatory actions. 
 
Network operators should be permitted to prioritize types of traffic that inherently 
require high bandwidth without discriminating within and among those types of 
applications.  Operators should be permitted to engage in uniform application-based 
prioritizing, in which all applications of a certain type are accorded the same priority of 
delivery.176  Under such regulation, broadband providers should not be prohibited from 
according higher priority to all Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) packets, for example, 
because such packets are latency-sensitive.177  However, broadband providers should be 
prohibited from prioritizing within such types of applications so as to favor their affiliated 
VoIP applications over those of a rival, as providers have been accused of doing in 
discriminating against VoIP provider Vonage while prioritizing and favoring their own 
VoIP applications, for example.178  To protect the free flow of information and the 
public’s access to information from a wide variety of sources, such discriminatory 
prioritization should be prohibited. 
 
In summary, Congress should pass legislation prohibiting (or requiring the FCC to 
prohibit) broadband providers from blocking legal content or applications across the 
board and from engaging in discriminatory prioritization or degradation of such content 
or applications.  Such legislation should also mandate transparency in blocking or 
degrading, requiring broadband providers to inform Internet users of any content or 
applications that were blocked or degraded and the reasons therefor, so that users will be 
                                                 
175 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
176 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION 
POLICY 88-89 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf. 
177 By employing packet marking, “‘preferential treatment can be given to latency-sensitive 
applications during periods of increased network congestion,’ and ‘[p]acket marking based on 
application classification . . . enables routers upstream or downstream . . . to prioritize traffic 
based on individual application requirements and address congestion at relevant network points.’”  
Id. at 89 (quoting CISCO SYSS., CISCO SERVICE CONTROL: A GUIDE TO SUSTAINED BROADBAND 
PROFITABILITY 4-5 (2005), available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/ 
CiscoBroadbandProfit.pdf). 
178 See NUNZIATO, supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the Madison River Communications incident, in which a 
DSL provider blocked access to Vonage).  
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able to impose meaningful checks on these decisions of broadband providers and ensure 




 Since the FCC embarked upon the path of removing common 
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers in 2002, the rights of 
Internet users to communicate on the Internet have been imperiled.  The stop-gap 
attempts undertaken by the FCC to remedy the problems caused by its decision to 
undertake this deregulatory course of action have been insufficient to protect Internet 
users’ free speech interests.  The Broadband Policy Statement promulgated by the FCC in 
2005 does not impose meaningful obligations on broadband providers.  Although the 
Supreme Court sought to assure Internet users that the FCC would protect their right to 
communicate in the broadband realm by exercising its ancillary jurisdiction, the exercise 
of such jurisdiction is fraught with procedural and other difficulties, as evidenced by the 
FCC’s recent informal adjudication in the Comcast case.  Because the FCC has declined 
to articulate generally applicable nondiscrimination rules for broadband providers, the 
rights of Internet users to communicate in the broadband realm are insufficiently 
protected.  Broadly applicable regulation or legislation is necessary to guarantee our right 
to communicate in the Internet age. 
 
